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Fairness and independence in investment arbitration: A critique of Susan 
Franck’s “Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration” 
Gus Van Harten∗ 
In this article, I review a prominent study, Franck (2009),1 that used quantitative research 
tools to evaluate possible bias in investment arbitration. The study has been cited in 
policy and academic discussions in order to allay concerns about the fairness and 
independence of investment arbitration. I argue here that findings and conclusions 
reached in the study were exaggerated or unsupported by the results of the study. 
In summary: 
- Franck’s study suffered from a lack of data, thus undermining its reliability. The lack 
of data led to a 40 to 80% of error across most of Franck’s results. Franck identified 
this high risk of error in a series of footnotes in the study but did not mention it 
alongside prominent claims that “development status does not have a statistically 
significant relationship with outcome” and that “outcome is not associated with 
arbitrator or respondent development status”. These claims were inaccurate in light 
of the high risk of error. The most clearly-supported conclusion of the study, 
although not identified by Franck, was that there was insufficient data to test the 
hypothesis with an acceptable level of reliability. 
- The study lacked validity in its measurement of development status. By using OECD 
membership as a proxy for developed-country status, Franck treated Mexico and 
former East Bloc countries as developed countries. In her results, 8 of the 18 cases 
(44%) classified by Franck as against developed countries were cases against Mexico 
and 3 of these 18 cases (17%) were against the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic. Although known to her prior to publication, Franck did not disclose this 
aspect of her results and explain why she considered it appropriate to treat Mexico 
and former East Bloc countries as developed countries. 
- The study is relevant to expectations of actual bias, observable at a systemic level, 
arising from aspects of the nationality of arbitrators and the identity of respondent 
states. It is of little or no relevance to questions of actual bias in specific cases and of 
perceptions of bias arising from institutional factors. Regardless of its results, the 
study could not provide a “powerful narrative” for or against the procedural integrity 
of the system, as was claimed by Franck. Likewise, the statement that the study 
“suggests that the investment treaty arbitration system, as a whole, functions fairly 
and that the eradication or radical overhaul of the arbitration process is 
∗ Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1 S.D. Franck, “Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2009) 50 Harvard 
International Law Journal 435. Further methodological background to this study was provided in S.D. 
Franck, “Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2007) 80 North 
Carolina Law Review 1. 
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unnecessary”2 was inappropriate in light of the lack of validity and reliability of the 
study. Much more information involving a wide range of factors would be required 
to contemplate such claims. 
This critique does not lead to the conclusion that there is evidence of actual bias in 
investment arbitration. The main lessons are that (1) there is far too little information to 
draw reliable conclusions either way based on quantitative research and (2) it is important 
to present empirical research with care and accuracy in order not to mislead policy-
makers and academic commentators alike. 
More broadly, the key institutional concern in investment arbitration is to ensure that 
reasonable perceptions of bias are addressed. The best way to do this is by introducing 
well-known institutional safeguards of independence in the process, not by seeking 
empirical proof or dis-proof of actual bias. 
Some concerns about perceived bias 
Investment treaty arbitration is unlike other forms of arbitration and international 
adjudication. It empowers arbitrators to make final decisions on public law and on 
important policy concerns. It raises issues of independence and impartiality that generally 
do not arise in other forms of arbitration. 
In other contexts, both domestic and international, public law is decided finally by judges 
whose independence from state and private power is protected by institutional 
safeguards, including secure tenure, bars on outside remuneration, and an objective 
method of case assignment. The absence of these safeguards in investment treaty 
arbitration raises a reasonable perception in all cases that inappropriate factors have 
influenced a decision or award. 
One set of possible influences arises from the financial and career interests of arbitrators 
who lack secure tenure and who engage in remunerative activities outside of the 
adjudicative role. Another arises from the potential influence of arbitral institutions and 
of private actors in the arbitration industry. Of course, the presence of these concerns 
does not explain fully the expected behaviour of arbitrators. One hopes and trusts that 
other considerations, values of fairness and integrity, will drive decisions. 
The problem is that no one—other than the individual decision-maker—can know 
whether inappropriate factors have come into play. For this reason, the actual behaviour 
of arbitrators is not the sole concern. As important is the role of institutional safeguards 
in addressing reasonable perceptions of bias. 
A final point is that openness is integral to independence and impartiality. Without 
openness, it is not possible to verify the fairness and integrity of a decision-making 
process. All empirical research on investment arbitration confronts this problem. At 
2 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 435. 
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present, in some cases, we do not know who made the decisions, what decisions were 
made, and what policy concerns arose.3 This fuels concerns about unfairness for the very 
reason that the process is being kept secret. 
Comment on Franck (2009) 
Empirical research can contribute, alongside deductive reasoning and doctrinal analysis, 
to the development of knowledge about investment law and its institutions. Yet 
empirical researchers must be clear about the questions they are examining and about the 
limitations and qualifications of their conclusions. These may seem like obvious points, 
but they are important to stress. 
A number of studies have reported on outcomes in known investment arbitrations. 
Some commentators have relied on such data to advance claims about the actual 
performance of arbitrators. Many of the studies to date, however, do not examine 
specific hypotheses of bias or position the study in terms of literature on institutional 
aspects of adjudicative independence. Existing studies also face serious methodological 
constraints and depend on assumptions that heavily qualify results.4 As such, one should 
be very cautious about using such studies to draw conclusions about the actual behaviour 
of arbitrators. 
A few studies have sought to analyze specific hypotheses of possible bias on the part of 
investment arbitrators. They have focused on actual bias (usually at a systemic level) as 
opposed to reasons for perceived bias. The study by Franck is probably the most 
prominent.5 
Outline of the study 
In the study, Prof. Franck examined hypotheses arising from individual factors that 
could generate actual bias in investment arbitration. These factors involved possible 
arbitrator prejudices tied to their nationality and/ or to characteristics of the respondent 
 This is especially true for arbitrations conducted in private forums such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce. 
4 For example, data on outcomes is typically drawn from ICSID, because of the relative openness of 
ICSID proceedings, and may say little or nothing about other forums. Also, data on outcomes as a 
measure of actual performance is open to a range of alternative explanations, such as variations in the 
strength of parties’ claims, diversity of fact situations, possible inflation by claimants of amounts 
claimed, procedural variations among forums, varying experience levels and incentives among 
arbitrators, and varying political influences of states and private actors. Existing data on outcomes 
also does not capture aspects of tribunal decisions – such interpretations of the law – that may reflect 
bias independently of outcome. It is also very difficult, if not impossible, to identify the 
“appropriate” or “fair” spread of outcomes against which actual outcomes are to be measured. 
Lastly, cumulative data on outcomes does not explain whether the outcome in any particular case was 
influenced by inappropriate factors. As such, there will always remain a basis for perceived pro-
investor or pro-state bias in specific instances based on inadequacies of the institutional structure. 
This is the concern that institutional safeguards of independence are meant to address. 
5 Franck (2009), above note 1. 
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state. Both of these factors were grouped according to the “development status” of 
arbitrators based on their nationality and respondent countries, and then compared to 
outcomes in specific cases. 
 
Franck’s hypothesis was that development status would not affect outcome and “that 
arbitrators can make decisions neutrally on the basis of the facts and law”.6
 
 The study 
design tested only the first element of this hypothesis, but was evidently intended to 
provide a basis for comment on the second. 
To test the hypothesis, Franck analyzed outcomes in 52 treaty cases with publicly-
available information. She applied two metrics to classify the development status of the 
presiding arbitrators and respondent states. The first metric was OECD membership. 
Arbitrators and countries were treated as “developed” if they (or their countries of 
nationality) were members of the OECD and as “developing” if they were non-
members. Second, the study classified arbitrators and countries based on the World Bank 
income classification system.7
 
 
Based on this analysis, the study did not find significant variations between outcomes 
linked to the development status of presiding arbitrators and respondent countries. In 
turn, Franck drew some bold conclusions about the integrity and fairness of investment 
arbitration. 
 
Franck’s outline of her methodology is commendable for its clarity and transparency. 
However, the study has limitations and, in some cases, important flaws. Most important 
is the extent to which Franck over-stated or mis-stated key conclusions. The following 
are examples, drawn from the main text, conclusion, or abstract of the study. 
 
- In the main text regarding the comparison of development status to win/ loss 
outcomes, it is stated that the study “offers a powerful narrative that there is 
procedural integrity in investment arbitration”.8
 
 
- In the main text regarding the comparison of development status and 
amount-of-damages outcomes, it is stated that the “lack of a main effect for a 
respondent’s development status stands in sharp contrast to the assertions 
                                                 
6 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 454. 
7 The World Bank income classification system divides countries, based on Gross National Income 
per capita, into four categories: high income, upper middle income, lower middle income, and low 
income. In classifying outcomes, Franck characterized as a win for the respondent state an award of 
no damages against the state. She treated as a loss an award of any amount in excess of zero damages 
against the state. Second, Franck evaluated outcome in terms of the amounts of money awarded in 
cases where the claimant was successful. Due to limitations in the available data, Franck’s sample was 
reduced to outcomes in 49 cases for the OECD metric and 47 or 49 cases (depending on whether a 
win/ loss or total damages outcome was being measured) for the World Bank metric. 
8 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 464. 
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that investment treaty arbitration unfairly privileges the developed world or 
improperly harms the developing world.”9
 
 
- In the study’s conclusion it is stated: 
 
“The notion that outcome is not associated with arbitrator or respondent 
development status should be a basis for cautious optimism. It provides 
evidence about the integrity of arbitration and casts doubt on the assumption 
that arbitrators from developed states show a bias in terms of arbitration 
outcomes or that the development status of respondent states affects such 
outcomes. It suggests that major structural overhaul may not be necessary 
because it is not clear that arbitration is inherently predisposed towards 
particular outcomes.”10
 
 
- In the study’s abstract it is stated: 
 
“The results demonstrate that, at the macro level, development status does 
not have a statistically significant relationship with outcome. This suggests 
that the investment treaty arbitration system, as a whole, functions fairly and 
that the eradication or radical overhaul of the arbitration process is 
unnecessary.”11
 
 
For the reasons outlined below, these statements, to varying degrees, are exaggerated or 
misplaced.  
 
 Limitations of the OECD metric 
 
An initial limitation of the study relates to the use of the OECD metric. The equation of 
OECD membership with developed status makes it likely that OECD countries that are 
reasonably classified as developing or transition countries (Mexico, Turkey, and the 
former East Bloc OECD countries) were classified as “developed”. This raises the 
prospect of a misclassification of the development status of arbitrators or countries in 
the data. 
 
This limitation would not be serious if it were communicated clearly and transparently by 
the researcher. However, Franck did not identify this limitation of the OECD metric in 
her study. She also did not attempt to indicate whether and how the findings might vary 
if the data was broken down in order to separate developed OECD countries from 
developing/ transition OECD countries. 
 
I examined Franck’s data in order to determine whether accounting for this aspect of the 
OECD metric affected the results. This was done by distinguishing Mexico, South 
                                                 
9 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 470. 
10 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 487. 
11 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 435. 
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Korea, and the former East Bloc countries from other OECD members.12
 
 The review 
confirmed that this limitation of the OECD metric affected significantly the study’s 
results. In particular: 
- In the 49 cases reviewed by Franck using the OECD metric, all 36 of the 
presiding arbitrators who were nationals of an OECD country were nationals 
of a “developed” OECD country. This included arbitrators from 13 
countries: United Kingdom (6 cases), Sweden (5), Australia (4), Germany (4), 
USA (4), Switzerland (3), Canada (2), France (2), Spain (2), Denmark (1), 
Greece (1), Italy (1), and the Netherlands (1).   
 
- Of the 36 tribunals with a presiding arbitrator who was a national of a 
developed OECD country, 10 decided cases against a developing or transition 
OECD country (including 7 cases against Mexico, 2 against the Czech 
Republic, and 1 against Slovakia). 
 
- Of the 13 tribunals with a presiding arbitrator who was not a national of an 
OECD country, 1 decided a case against a developing OECD country 
(Mexico). 
 
- Accounting for the heterogeneity of OECD membership, then, 10 cases 
should have been classified as developed-to-developing or developed-to-
transition arbitrations rather than as developed-to-developed arbitrations. 
Also, 1 case should have been classified as a developing-to-developing rather 
than a developing-to-developed arbitration. 
  
Thus, in Franck’s study, 11 of the 49 cases were arguably mis-classified. By accounting 
for the heterogeneity of OECD membership, the ratio of developed to developing 
respondent countries in Franck’s data dropped dramatically from a ratio of 18 to 31 to a 
ratio of 7 to 42. 
 
The limitations of the OECD metric are not the critical point here. The key issue is the 
lack of transparency about a methodological limitation that undermines the validity the 
study. As outlined, use of the OECD metric arguably led to a misclassification of 22% of 
cases. But the study does not highlight this concern to the reader or attempt to examine 
how it affected the results.13
 
 
                                                 
12 I examined OECD membership in 2009, which was the year of publication of Franck’s study. 
Thus, Chile, Israel, and Slovenia – which joined the OECD in 2010 – were characterized as non-
OECD members for purposes of this review of Franck’s data. 
13 Note that this criticism of the OECD metric was conveyed to Professor Franck prior to 
publication of her 2009 study, above note 1. Other criticisms laid out in this article were not 
conveyed until after publication of the study. 
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 Collapsing of the World Bank metric 
 
A second limitation involved the World Bank income classification metric that was used 
by Franck to measure development status. This limitation arose from a lack of data. 
 
Franck sought to compare income levels of the countries of nationality of presiding 
arbitrators to the income levels of respondent states. As such, there were 16 boxes in 
which the study required data in order to test her hypotheses using the 4-level World 
Bank metric. However, Franck did not have enough data to do this. First, there were no 
cases at all decided by presiding arbitrators from low income countries; thus, four of the 
16 boxes in Franck’s analysis contained no data. Second, there was only one case that 
was decided by a presiding arbitrator from a lower middle income country. 
 
In response to this lack of data, Franck collapsed the 16-box grid into an 8-box grid.14
 
 In 
turn, all but one of the cases decided by a “developed country” presiding arbitrator 
involved arbitrators from upper-middle income countries. Franck was transparent about 
the need to collapse the World Bank metric. This allows the reader to see that the World 
Bank metric was frustrated by a lack of data. 
On the other hand, the limitations of the World Bank and the OECD metrics highlight 
that the study tested only very narrow aspects of questions about possible bias, let alone 
fairness and independence, in investment arbitration. Specifically, the study relied on a 
limited data pool to test whether there was a connection between nationality groupings 
of arbitrators or countries and particular outcomes. Regardless of its results, the study 
could not provide a “powerful narrative” either for or against the procedural integrity of 
the system or support conclusions on whether the system “functions fairly”. Far more 
information involving a wide range of factors would be required to contemplate such 
claims. 
 
 Lack of data and corresponding risk of error 
 
A major limitation of the study is common in empirical work on investment arbitration. 
This is the lack of data, which in turn raises concerns about reliability. 
 
The lack of data in this case frustrated the drawing of reliable conclusion to support or 
refute Franck’s hypothesis that development status would not affect outcome.15
 
 Indeed, 
the only clearly-supported conclusion of Franck’s study was that there was insufficient 
data to test her hypothesis with an acceptable level of reliability. This lack of reliability 
affected all four of the metrics employed by the study. 
A claim of statistical significance about a hypothesized connection (or lack of 
connection) between variables requires sufficient data to remove any significant risk that 
the apparent relationships are explained by chance. Franck calculated that the number of 
                                                 
14 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 459. 
15 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 454. 
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awards needed to generate statistically significant findings (on her standard, findings that 
carried a 20% chance of error). Depending on the metric and the effect size of the 
results, between 382 and 781 awards were required for most of Franck’s comparisons.16
 
 
Yet the available sample sizes were between 47 and 49 awards. 
This led to a 40 to 80% chance of error (so-called “Type II error”, referring to the risk of 
a false negative) in Franck’s results. As a result, there was insufficient evidence of either 
the presence or absence of a statistically significant connection between development 
status and outcome. Findings or conclusions beyond this, based on the results, lack 
reliability due to the high risk of error. 
 
It was rigorous and transparent for Franck to provide these calculations on the risk of 
error and to indicate the corresponding limitations. But these issues were reported only 
in a series of footnotes and, in some instances, tangentially in the main text.17
 
 
Importantly, Franck did not mention the high risk of error underlying the bold claims 
reproduced above. 
More fundamentally, the study relied on the risk of error associated with a hypothesized 
connection between development status and outcome in order to convey that there was 
in fact no connection between development status and outcome.18
 
 The latter does not 
necessarily follow from the former. The more appropriate conclusion to draw was that 
there was insufficient data to test the hypothesis that development status would not 
affect outcome. 
For these reasons, Franck’s results do not establish that “development status does not 
have a statistically significant relationship with outcome”, for example, as was claimed. 
Development status may or may not affect outcome; based on Franck’s study, we do not 
know with a reasonable degree of reliability. Likewise, the high risk of error should have 
precluded Franck from reporting that “outcome is not associated with arbitrator or 
respondent development status”. 
 
Failure to account for alternative explanations 
 
In empirical research, there is typically a range of alternative explanations for results. It is 
important for a researcher to convey clearly that such alternatives exist and to avoid 
undue emphasis on one or a small number of possible explanations. 
 
However, Franck emphasized only a limited set of explanations for her results—such as 
the prospect that the system functions fairly—while neglecting others. One alternative 
explanation, for example, is that arbitrators do not make decisions based on nationality, 
but rather based on their membership in a common culture or industry of arbitrators. 
Another is that the facts of cases involving some classes of countries are more 
                                                 
16 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 461-70. 
17 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 461-70. 
18 Franck (2009), above note 1, p. 460-62. 
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favourable to investors than the facts of cases involving others countries, and that factual 
differences will lead to variations in outcome. 
 
Even assuming that her results were reliable, it was an over-reach for Franck, in light of 
alternative explanations, to draw conclusions on the “integrity of arbitration”, on 
whether the system “functions fairly”, or on whether there is need for a “major structural 
overhaul”. A wide range of institutional and individual concerns about potential bias 
were simply not tested by the study. 
 
Conclusions 
 
These issues and concerns do not raise problems with the empirical method itself, but 
rather with the way in which the method was employed in Franck’s study. Many of the 
limitations of the study could have been avoided with greater transparency and caution 
on the part of the researcher in the statement of conclusions.  
 
The fundamental problem is the way in which Franck constituted and presented her 
conclusions. The key problems are: 
 
- the claim that a lack of reliable evidence of a connection between nationality 
and outcome demonstrated the absence of such a connection, 
 
- the failure to make clear that the lack of data precluded the study’s hypothesis 
from being tested reliably, and 
 
- the failure to highlight alternative explanations for the results in statements of 
the conclusions. 
 
This discussion highlights how important it is for a researcher to present findings and 
conclusions accurately and with care. Otherwise, there is a danger that policy makers will 
take up a study for purposes that the research does not support, as has happened in the 
case of Franck’s work.19
 
 
Most importantly, it would be a mistake to rely on quantitative methods to address 
perceived bias in adjudication. Absent an admission by the decision-maker, it is not 
possible to show definitively whether inappropriate factors have affected a particular 
decision or award. This explains why it is critical for the institutional structure of 
adjudication to allay concerns about the financial or career interests of adjudicators, 
regardless of whether or not these factors are affecting actual decisions. The priority is 
not to seek definitive proof or dis-proof of actual bias but rather to anticipate and 
                                                 
19 See the separate statement by a member of the U.S. Model BIT Review committee, Mark Kantor, 
who cited Franck’s conclusion on development status and outcome in support of his position against 
reform of the U.S. Model BIT. United States, Report of the Advisory Committee on International Economic 
Policy Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (30 September 2009), Annex B (Particular 
Viewpoints of Subcommittee Members), Statement of Mark Kantor, p. 28-9. 
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address the uncertainties that give rise to reasonably perceived bias. At the institutional 
level, this calls for the incorporation of well-known safeguards of judicial independence 
in order to support public confidence in the fairness of adjudication. 
 
 
 
